

Fluidra, S.A. Directors' Remuneration Policy 2024

Text subject to approval by the Shareholders'
Meeting of 7 of May 2025

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1. Introduction

The Board of Directors of Fluidra, S.A. (the **"Company"** of **"Fluidra"**), following a proposal made by the Appointments and Remuneration Committee (**"ARC"**), resolved during its meeting of March, 25 2025, to submit to the Fluidra Shareholders' Meeting (the **"Shareholders' Meeting"** or **"Meeting"**) to be voted upon with binding effect, the remuneration policy for members of the Company's Board of Directors (**"Board of Directors"** or **"Board"**) for fiscal years 2025, – as from its approval – , 2026, 2027 and 2028 (the **"Remuneration Policy"** or **"Policy"**), as a separate Agenda item, in accordance with section 529.2 of the amended Capital Companies Act approved by Royal Legislative Decree 1/2010, of July 2, 2010 (the **"LSC"** o **"Capital Companies Act"**).

The Remuneration Policy for fiscal years 2024 through to the 31 December 2027 was approved in 2024 before the end of the term of the previous Remuneration Policy. However, the change in the make-up of the Board of Directors through the appointment of a new chief executive officer (**"CEO"**) at Fluidra, as tabled for approval together with this Policy by the Shareholders' Meeting, has made it necessary to adapt the Remuneration Policy, which will enter into force on the date of its approval until 31 December 2028.

The Remuneration Policy whose approval is being proposed continues along the same lines as that currently in force insofar the principles, structure and the content of remuneration packages are concerned. It therefore adheres to the same principles and rules as the previous policy, namely, that remuneration should be reasonably commensurate to the size of the Company, its financial position and market standards for comparable companies, and should be geared towards promoting the creation of value sustainable over the long term by linking the remuneration of Fluidra's directors (**"Directors"**) to results and to the shareholders' best interests, while including the necessary safeguards to avoid excessive risk-taking and rewarding of poor results.

The changes made in respect of the previous policy are described below from a quantitative perspective:

(1.a.i.1.I) Adjustment of the remuneration of the executive Directors (**"Executive Directors"**) to match the remuneration of the new CEO, whose appointment will be tabled for approval together with this Policy by the Meeting.

Insofar as the new CEO is concerned, his remuneration is backed by a new comparative analysis with the aim of matching his remuneration to that of executive directors in comparable companies, based on Fluidra's size, sector, and

the domestic and international markets in which it operates. This analysis was conducted by the consultancy Willis Towers and Watson, based on the following criteria for selecting a baseline group: companies in the industrial sector, including companies that are competitors in the pool sector, and other companies considered competitors in respect of recruiting similar talent, whose turnover and market capitalization is approximately between 25 and 400% of Fluidra's size. The companies selected to carry out this comparative study are based in the United States as the new CEO was selected from among candidates from this country and its operational headquarters will also be in the United States, due to the relevance of the American market, both in terms of the current climate and of Fluidra's strategy for the future.¹

The Executive Chairman's remuneration has not undergone any changes in comparison with the previous policy.

(1.a.i.1.I) Description of the main characteristics of the long-term incentive for the key and executive directors that is being tabled for approval together with this Policy (**"2025-2029 Plan"**), following the start of the third and last cycle of the 2022-2026 Plan on 31 December 2024. The structure of the 2025-2029 Plan will follow along the same lines as the 2022-2026 Plan, as it is also made up of 3 cycles that each last for 3 years.

The aim of all the above is to ensure that directors' remuneration is commensurate with the Company's current size and with the value generated for the shareholders, and that it promotes the retention of key talent and alignment with market practices at both a domestic and international level.

¹ The Annual Report on Remuneration that is to be tabled for approval by the Board, alongside this Policy, includes a list of the group of companies selected to conduct the comparative analysis of the new CEO's remuneration.

2. General principles and practices

2.1 General principles

The Directors' Remuneration Policy has been drawn up having regard to (i) applicable legislation, (ii) the provisions of the Bylaws and of the Board of Directors' Regulations (the "**Board Regulations**"), (iii) Corporate Governance recommendations, (iv) the information received from institutional investors and proxy advisors; and (v) best practices in the market, as seen in companies which are comparable in terms of size, activity, and the complexity and geographic location of their business, in which respect support has been received from external advisors.

The general principles that govern the Remuneration Policy are as follows:

Alignment with market practices	<p>The remuneration structure and overall figures must take into account legislative changes and recommendations and be consistent with trends and references with respect to remuneration seen in the market, among national and international companies which are comparable in terms of size, activity, and the complexity and geographic location of their business.</p> <p>The objective should be to attract and retain talent with the right profiles to ensure that Fluidra's strategic objectives can be achieved, by offering competitive remuneration.</p>
Value creation	<p>Remuneration should be geared towards fomenting attitudes which ensure the generation of long-term value in the Fluidra Group, and the sustainability of results over time, while including the necessary safeguards to avoid excessive risk-taking and the rewarding of poor results.</p>
Alignment with the interests of shareholders and with the Company's sustainability strategy and environmental commitment	<p>Remuneration should pursue the alignment of the interests of the Directors with those of shareholders, in order to encourage long-term, sustainable value creation.</p> <p>It is for this reason that a reasonable proportion of the remuneration corresponding to Executive Directors', both short- and long-term, should be variable. Variable remuneration, linked to specific and pre-determined objectives, should be aligned with the attainment of financial and non-financial objectives which allow for the creation of value in the Fluidra Group. The non-financial objectives established will include those linked to ESG, since the progress made in ESG and the environmental commitment and objectives of the Fluidra Group should be a relevant criterion when it comes to determining remuneration.</p>
Fairness and proportionality of remuneration	<p>Remuneration must be set based on the dedication, qualifications and level of responsibility required by the post, as well as the experience, functions and tasks performed by each Director, without the independence of non-executive Directors being compromised. A balance must be maintained between fairness at internal level and competitiveness in the market. The remuneration policy must guarantee non-discrimination on the basis of, among others, gender, age, culture, religion and race.</p>
Transparency	<p>The rules on the management of remuneration must be explicit, be made known to the Directors, and be drafted in a clear and concise manner.</p> <p>The Company must comply in any event with the reporting obligations regarding directors' remuneration set out in the LSC, as well as in any other applicable legislation, and align itself with best practice in the area of corporate governance. To generate trust on the part of shareholders and investors, the Company must be transparent in the information it discloses with regard to Directors' remuneration.</p> <p>A breakdown of remuneration items, allocation criteria and individual amounts will be published in the Annual Report on Remuneration ("ARR"). The ARR will also publish the short- and long-term variable remuneration accrued in any given year, the targets of the indicators to which it is linked, their degree of attainment and the proportion of the incentive accrued for each indicator, based on the success rate of the targets to which they are linked.</p>

2.2 Practices

Implementing the principles set out under point 2.1 above, Fluidra will adopt the following practices in relation to its Remuneration Policy:

Non-Executive Directors²

- Remuneration will be appropriate to their level of dedication, qualifications and responsibility, without compromising their independence, and will be in line with market conditions to maintain competitiveness.
- There are no remuneration components linked to the performance of Fluidra or to personal performance.
- They receive no remuneration in the form of shares.
- They may not receive severance for dismissal or termination of their appointment to office.
- The Company has assumed no obligations or commitments whatsoever in relation to pension, retirement or similar plans.

• Alignment with market practices.

The Company regularly conducts benchmark studies on the remuneration non-executive Directors are paid to ensure their alignment with market practices.

Executive Directors

• Balanced composition.

Balance between fixed components and variable components (annual and multi-year).

Variable remuneration, linked to the achievement of financial and non-financial objectives, including ESG and value-creation objectives, must be based on a medium- and long-term view, encouraging long-term action in strategic terms in addition to the attainment of short-term results, in light of the current situation and the Company's outlook and objectives with regard to sustainable growth, without variable remuneration jeopardizing the Company's capacity to maintain its solvency and financial situation.

• Contribution to the business strategy and to the long-term interests and sustainability of the Company.

The remuneration corresponding to the Executive Directors must be consistent with the Company's strategy and contribute to the achievement of objectives and results by the Fluidra group, as is described in section 9 below

• Remuneration aligned with the remuneration conditions applicable to employees of the Company.

As is explained in section 8 below, remuneration for the performance of executive functions must be consonant with the policy established by the Company regarding the remuneration of executives, and be based on the same principles.

• Alignment with market practices.

Assisted by external advisors, the Company regularly conducts benchmark studies on the amounts and structure of the remuneration Executive Directors are paid to ensure their alignment with market practices.

• Assistance from external advisers.

The Company seeks assistance from external advisers to review and implement the Remuneration Policy of Executive Directors, amongst others, and benchmark studies are conducted on the amounts and structure of the remuneration Executive Directors are paid, as well as in the design and roll-out of long-term incentives.

² The external Directors who would previously have been Executive Directors may be paid the variable remuneration granted to them while they discharged executive functions, but whose payment is made following the end of these executive functions, provided that the grounds for the termination of their executive functions allowed them to be still entitled to its payment, whether in full or in part.

3. Remuneration policy with regard to Executive Directors in their capacity as such

3.1 Remuneration components

- A fixed amount of remuneration in cash established based on their position and responsibility. In this respect, the fixed remuneration of the chairman of the Board and of the coordinator of the Board is higher than that of the other members in view of their greater responsibility for the efficient functioning of the Board.
- A fixed amount of cash remuneration for their participation in the Committees of the Board (the "**Committees**"), which are currently the ARC, the Audit Committee, the Delegated Committee, and the Strategy and ESG Delegated Committee. The remuneration received by the chairs of such Committees is higher than the amount paid to the other Committee members in view of their greater responsibility for the efficient functioning thereof.
- Fees for attending the meetings of the Board or its Committees. The amount received by Directors who reside outside of Europe is higher than the amount received by the other members of the Board.

The maximum amount of remuneration will remain unchanged on the same terms in following years until the Shareholders' Meeting approves a new amount. Likewise, the internal distribution amongst the Directors will remain unchanged until the Board of Directors approves a different distribution.

The distribution of such an amount between the Board members, as resolved upon by the Board of Directors for 2025, is indicated below, although this may be reviewed in subsequent years, as described below:

The maximum amount of annual remuneration that the Company may pay to all of its Directors in respect of the supervisory and collegiate decision-making functions of their Directorship positions, for all items, will be established for such purpose by the Shareholders' Meeting, and will remain in force until the Shareholders' Meeting changes it, although the Board of Directors may stipulate a lower amount. The setting of the exact amount to be paid within this limit and the distribution thereof among the Directors are tasks corresponding to the Board of Directors, at the proposal of the ARC, in the proportions it freely determines, having regard to the criteria and principles described above.

3.2 Breakdown of remuneration envisaged for the years covered by the remuneration policy

The maximum annual remuneration corresponding to the Directors in respect of the supervisory and collegiate decision-making functions of their Directorship positions, submitted for approval by the Shareholders' Meeting along with this Policy, amounts to 2,200,000 euros.



€ 92,000

euros per annum for each member
of the Board of Directors

For the responsibility and dedication required of members of the various Committees and that involved in the Chairmanship and coordination of the Board:

<p>An additional € 20,000</p> <p>euros per annum for each member of the ARC, except for the Committee chairman, who will receive an additional 40,000 euros.</p>	<p>An additional € 20,000</p> <p>an additional 20,000 euros per annum for each member of the Audit Committee, except for the Committee chairman, who will receive an additional 40,000 euros.</p>	<p>An additional € 12,000</p> <p>additional euros for each member of the Delegated Committee, and the Strategy and ESG Committee.</p>
<p>An additional 50,000</p> <p>euros per annum for the Chairman of the Board of Directors</p>	<p>An additional 25,000</p> <p>euros per annum for the Director serving as coordinator of the Board of Directors.</p>	

particular, to the functions attributed, responsibilities assumed and level of dedication required.

Fees for attending the meetings of the Board or its Committees amount to 8,000 per annum. The amount received by those Directors who reside outside Europe, however, is 20,000 euros per annum.

Finally, the Directors will be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the provision of their services, provided that these are duly evidenced.

The Board of Directors, upon a proposal by the ARC, may amend the proposal for the distribution of remuneration between the members of the managing body, as agreed in respect of 2025, to bring it into line with the level of dedication of its members and market practice. Any modifications must be duly reported in the ARR.

The remuneration of the directors in respect of the supervisory and collegiate decision-making functions corresponding to their Directorship positions will in any event be adapted to the system defined at any given time by the Bylaws and to the maximum amount of remuneration approved by the Shareholders' Meeting. Consequently, this Remuneration Policy, insofar as relates to the supervisory and collegiate decision-making functions corresponding to the Directors in their capacities as such, will be deemed modified to the same extent as the Shareholders' Meeting approves a maximum figure other than that established in this section.

However, the Executive Directors who are members of the Delegated Committee, and the Strategy and ESG Committee will not receive any additional amount for their membership thereof.

In accordance with the provisions of the agreement signed by Fluidra with the CEO, the remuneration that he receives for his oversight and joint decision-making functions inherent to his status as Director will reduce the total amount of his remuneration that he should receive for his executive functions.

In the event of new Committees being formed, the remuneration corresponding to the members thereof for their participation in such Committees will be similar in terms and structure to that corresponding to the Directors for their participation in the current Committees, having regard, in

4. Remuneration policy with regard to Executive Directors

4.1 Remunerations components

Fixed remuneration

Remuneration based on level of responsibility and professional background, geared towards alignment with market rates. Fixed remuneration will include both remuneration in cash and in kind (use of vehicle, family health insurance, or similar benefits).

The Executive Directors will be named as insureds under the civil liability insurance policy for directors and executives of Fluidra, covering them against any liabilities incurred as a result of the performance of their functions, all in accordance with the subjective scope defined in the corresponding policies signed by the Company.

Annual variable remuneration

During the first quarter of each year, in light of the budget and strategic priorities of the Fluidra Group, the Board of Directors, following a proposal by the ARC, will determine the specific economic and management objectives applicable for the current year and the weight corresponding to each of such objectives, in accordance with the objectives of Fluidra, ensuring the alignment thereof with the creation of value in the Company and with the interests of its shareholders. Such objectives may be economic-financial or non-financial, including objectives linked to ESG or to the personal performance of the Executive Directors. Such objectives must be consistent, internally, with those established for the Group's management team.

Once the year has ended, and following the receipt of whatever supporting documentation it considers appropriate, the Board of Directors, at the proposal of the ARC, will evaluate the level of achievement of the objectives determined at the start of the year and will approve the amounts of variable remuneration to be received by each Executive Director based on the level reached.

For the period for which the Remuneration Policy remains in force, annual variable remuneration, prior to weighting based on the achievement scale, may not exceed 150% of fixed remuneration in respect of executive functions. The achievement scale for economic objectives ranges from 0%, in the event of failure to attain the minimum levels, up to a maximum of 185% of target annual variable remuneration in the event of achieving or exceeding the maximum values established for each indicator.

Once the amount of annual variable remuneration has been approved, it will be paid to the Executive Directors in cash, with

the corresponding withholdings, social security contributions or similar taxes applicable having been applied. The payment will be made once the Financial Statements of Fluidra have been issued, taking into consideration any possible qualifications in the external audit report.

The Company will consider periodically the possibility of establishing a malus clause in respect of short-term variable remuneration.

Long-term variable remuneration

The Executive Directors may participate in long-term incentive ("LTI") plans based on Fluidra equity instruments, or linked to the value of such instruments, established by the Company for its executive personnel.

The LTI will entitle its beneficiaries to receive, once a certain period of time has elapsed, an amount in shares or other instruments, in options over the same, or cash, subject to fulfillment of the conditions and strategic objectives established in the LTI.

These plans will be of a recurring nature, their specific conditions being set by the Board of Directors upon a proposal by the ARC. They must be in alignment and compatible with the principles of the Remuneration Policy and be approved by the Fluidra Shareholders' Meeting.

In accordance with Corporate Governance recommendations in this respect, the conditions established in the LTI will include the following:

- The incentive must cover a minimum period of three years, and may take the form successive cycles initiated each year or single cycles.
- The metrics and the weight carried by each of them will be defined, in the case of a single cycle, by the Shareholders' Meeting, and for overlapping cycles by (i) the Shareholders' Meeting for the first cycle and (ii) by the Board of Directors in the case of all other cycles, following a proposal by the ARC, for which long-term value creation and sustainability must be taken into consideration. ESG metrics must be included. The objectives to be met in relation to each metric for the incentive to accrue for all the cycles will be defined by the Board of Directors.
- The Board of Directors, upon a proposal by the ARC, will define the minimum achievement threshold for the objectives corresponding to each metric, below which the part of the LTI



linked to such metric will not accrue, as well as the maximum threshold.

- Once the LTI has come to an end, the Board of Directors, upon a proposal by the ARC, will establish the level of achievement of the objectives corresponding to the LTI metrics.
- The LTI to be settled will take into account any qualifications in the external auditor's report that reduce the Company's earnings or metrics to which the incentive is linked.
- The LTI must include the necessary safeguards to avoid excessive risk-taking and the rewarding of poor results. Thus, the LTI will include clauses that allow:
 - Deferral of settlement for the minimum period of time necessary in order to verify that the pre-established conditions to which it is linked have indeed been met.
 - Non-settlement of the incentive if the beneficiary has been penalized for a serious breach of the code of ethical conduct pursuant to the Company's internal regulations.
 - A reimbursement to be claimed when the payment made did not conform to the established terms, or when the payment was made on the basis of data which are subsequently proven to be inaccurate.
 - In the event of the LTI being settled in Fluidra shares, once they have been awarded and for three years as from the end of the LTI, the Executive Directors will be banned from transferring the shares received until they come to hold a number of shares equivalent to at least twice their annual fixed remuneration. The above, however, will not apply to shares which the Executive Director needs to sell, should the case arise, in order to meet costs relating to their acquisition, including the taxation deriving from the transfer of the shares, or in the event of a dispensation having been approved by the Board of Directors, upon a favorable report by the ARC, in response to supervening circumstances of an extraordinary nature which merit such dispensation.

Pension and other welfare benefits

A commitment in respect of the contingencies of death and disability may be recognized in favor of the Executive Directors.

A defined-contribution pension commitment entailing the setting up of a retirement pension fund through annual contributions made by the Company may also be recognized in their favor.

The above commitments are to be implemented through insurance contracts.

Severance payments in the event of removal and remuneration in respect of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking and/or non-solicitation undertaking

- Amounts of and limits to severance payments for termination of contract.

The amount of severance for termination of the contracts of the Executive Directors in respect of their directorship functions may not exceed twice the sum of their maximum annual fixed and variable remuneration.

Standard payments corresponding to the advance notice period will not be classed as severance pay for the termination of an employment contract.

- Post-contractual non-compete and non-solicitation undertaking.

The Executive Directors' contracts may contain post-contractual non-compete and/or non-solicitation undertakings, for which the corresponding remuneration may (i) be included in the amount of remuneration envisaged in favor of the Director, or (ii) consist of an additional amount, in which case it may not exceed the sum of the fixed components of the remuneration that the Executive Director would have obtained had he/she remained with the Company for the duration of the non-compete undertaking.

4.2 Breakdown of remuneration envisaged for the years covered by the remuneration policy

Annual fixed remuneration

D. Eloy Planes,
Chairman:

€ 510,000

D. Jaime Ramirez,
CEO:

\$816,000

Mr. Jaime Ramírez' fixed annual remuneration as CEO will be proportional to the time over which he has been an Executive Director in a calendar year. In 2025, until his date of appointment as Executive Director, Mr. Jaime Ramírez has had an employment relationship with the Fluidra Group, for which he had been paid the same fixed annual remuneration as that anticipated he would be paid as CEO.

These are the amounts envisaged for 2025 and they may be reviewed annually by the Board of Directors, upon a proposal by the ARC, for the years covered by the Remuneration Policy. The variation over the entire period for which this Remuneration



Policy remains in force is not expected to exceed 30% of the amount stipulated for 2025. Any change to the amount of annual fixed remuneration for 2026, 2027 and 2028 will be included in the corresponding ARR.

The Executive Directors receive certain remuneration in kind, including use of a vehicle, life insurance, and family health insurance. As is the case with the other Directors, they are also included as insureds under the civil liability policy for directors and executives of Fluidra.

Annual variable remuneration

The annual variable remuneration corresponding to the Executive Directors, prior to weighting based on the achievement scale, will be 100% of fixed remuneration at the end of the year for executive functions for the Executive Chairman, and 150% for the CEO.

For example, the objectives to which annual variable remuneration is linked for 2025 are as follows:

- 1.a.i.i. 85% economic objectives. Free cash-flow (25%), PF Cash EPS (25%), EBITDA (25%) and total growth in sales (10%), and
- 1.a.i.ii. 15% non-financial objectives. Of the non-financial objectives, 5% are linked to achievement of the company's ESG objectives.

Similarly, in 2025, the achievement scale ranges from 40%, in the event of achieving the minimum levels established for each indicator (0% if they are not reached), up to a maximum of 185% of target annual variable remuneration in the event of achieving the maximum values established for each indicator.

The metrics for 2026, 2027 and 2028, the weight corresponding to each metric and the achievement scale will be published in the corresponding ARR. The ARR will also publish the annual variable remuneration paid in any given year, the targets of the economic-financial indicators to which its accrual is linked, their degree of attainment and the proportion of the incentive accrued for each indicator, based on the success rate of the targets.

Long-term variable remuneration

The Executive Directors participate in the following long-term incentive plans:

Long-Term Incentive Plan or the 2022–2026 Plan

On the date of approval of the Remuneration Policy, the Executive Directors³ will be covered by the second and third cycles of the Long-Term Incentive Plan ("**2022–2026 Plan**"). In 2022, the Shareholders' Meeting approved the main terms and conditions of the 2022–2026 Plan, which has been attached as Annex I to this Policy.

The 2022–2026 Plan, divided into three separate cycles, of which the second and third cycles were in force on the date of the approval of this Policy, is implemented at the beginning of each cycle through the award of a certain number of units that will then be used as a reference in order to determine the final number of Fluidra shares ("**Shares**") to be delivered to the Beneficiaries after a certain period of time, as long as certain strategic objectives of the Fluidra Group are fulfilled and the requirements provided for in the Regulations of the 2022–2026 Plan are met.

The number of Shares to be delivered to the Executive Directors in each of the two cycles in force should all incentives ("**Target Incentives**") have been attained, whilst if the top level of attainment is reached or exceeded (i.e. 172% of the Incentive Target will be obtained), is as shown below:

	Executive Chairman		Chief Executive Officer	
	100%	Maximum degree of attainment	100%	Maximum degree of attainment
Second cycle	88,500	152,220	0	0
Third cycle	66,811	114,915	195,734	336,662

After joining the Fluidra Group in 2024 as an employee, Mr. Jaime Ramírez was made a beneficiary of just the third cycle of the 2022–2026 Plan, whereby he was allocated 195,734 units, which he continues to hold under the same conditions, following his appointment as CEO. The number of units allocated to him in the third cycle was calculated on a pro rata basis in respect of the number of units that would have fallen to him for the three cycles of the 2022–2026 Plan, given the time that has elapsed since the date he joined the Fluidra Group until the end date of the 2022–2026 Plan.

³ The external director, Mr. Bruce Brooks, as an Executive Director in 2023 and 2024, was made a beneficiary of the second and third cycles of the 2022–2026 Plan, which were in force on the date of the approval of this Policy, as a result of which he continued to hold the units that were allocated to him following the termination of his post as Executive Director. Specifically, Mr. Brooks continues to hold 70,800 units from the second cycle out of the 106,200 allocated to him, whereby he could receive a maximum of 121,776 shares should he secure the top level of attainment of the metrics to which they are linked, and 26,724 units from the third cycle out of the 80,173 allocated to him, whereby he could receive a maximum of 45,965 shares should he secure the top level of attainment of the metrics to which they are linked.



The metrics for the second and third cycles of the 2022–2026 Plan, the weight corresponding to each metric and the achievement scale are published in the 202 and 2024 ARR, respectively.

The ARR for the year the long-term incentives paid in any given cycle must report the targets of the indicators to which their accrual are linked, their degree of attainment and the proportion of the long-term incentive accrued for each indicator are based on the success rate of the targets.

Long-Term Incentive Plan or the 2025–2029 Plan

Following the start of the three cycles of the 2022–2026 Plan on 31 December 2024, the general conditions of the 2025–2029 Plan, which are attached as Annex II hereto, were submitted for approval by the Shareholders' Meeting together with this Policy.

The structure of the 2025–2029 Plan will follow along the same lines as the 2022–2026 Plan, as it is also made up of 3 overlapping cycles that each last for 3 years.

Welfare benefits

A commitment in respect of the contingencies of death and disability is recognized in favor of the Executive Directors, equal to 4 times their gross annual fixed remuneration at the time of death.

In case of total or absolute permanent or severe disability occurring prior to the termination of their contracts, the Executive Directors will receive, until they reach 65 years of age, a monthly payment equal to one-twelfth of 75% of their last gross annual fixed remuneration at the time the disability occurred under similar conditions to the rest of the Group's directors, namely, a maximum amount of 50,000 dollars per month in the case of the CEO.

A defined-contribution pension commitment entailing the setting up of a retirement pension fund has also been recognized in favor of the Executive Directors. The contributions made by the Company in 2025 amount to 16,000 euros in the case of Mr. Eloy Planes Corts and are estimated at 12,000 euros in the case of Mr. Jaime Ramírez.

These commitments are implemented through insurance contracts.

Other terms and conditions

Pursuant to the agreement on the CEO's functions signed between Fluidra and Mr. Ramírez, the remuneration paid to him:

- i. by any other company in the Group, or
- ii. by the Company for the oversight and joint decision-making functions inherent to his post as director, will reduce his

total remuneration that he should be paid for his executive functions (including the remuneration in cash and in kind, and/or any other payment for the termination of his contract, as the case may be).

Changes during the term of the Remuneration Policy

Any change in the proportions or structure of the components of the remuneration of the Executive Directors will be made in accordance with the principles established in this Remuneration Policy.

4.3 Relative proportions of remuneration components


The remuneration system applicable to the Executive Directors reflects a balanced and efficient relationship between fixed components and variable annual and multi-year components, in such a way that the fixed component accounts for a sufficiently large part of total remuneration, the aim being to establish a balance between the prudent management of risks and the achievement of short- and long-term objectives, to foment sustainable value creation in the Fluidra Group.

The approach adopted in the determination of variable remuneration is flexible, in order to respond appropriately to results achieved. Such remuneration may be zero in cases in which the minimum threshold for achievement of the objectives to which its accrual is linked has not been met.

Item	Scenario	Executive Chairman	Chief Executive Officer
Fixed Remuneration ("FR")¹	All	100%	100%
Annual variable remuneration (vs FR)²	Minimum	0%	0%
	Target	100%	150%
	Maximum	185%	277.50%
Long-term incentive² (vs the FR)	Minimum	0%	0%
	Target	250%	345%
	Maximum ³	430%	593.40%

1. Neither remuneration in kind nor contributions to retirement plans are included since their amount is not material.
2. The current LTIs during the term of the Policy are overlapping cycles, whereby a new cycle starts every year and lasts for 3 years. The units allocated in each of the three cycles of the 2022–2026 Plan, in addition to the first cycle of the 2025–2026 Plan (the only cycle approved by the Meeting together with this Policy), of which the Executive Directors are beneficiaries, have been calculated based on the same percentage of the beneficiary's fixed remuneration, namely, 250% in the case of Mr. Planes and 350% in the case of Mr. Ramírez. The percentage on the fixed remuneration for every cycle allocated to the Executive Chairman in the 2025–2029 Plan is the same as he was allocated in the 2022–2026 Plan (see Annex 1, General Conditions of the 2022–2026 Plan). The percentage allocated to Mr. Ramírez is 450%.
3. 172% of the target figure, in accordance with the General Conditions of the respective Plans.

Remuneration mix of fixed and variable remuneration (annual and multi-year) ⁴



4.4 Main terms of the contracts of the Executive Directors

The contracts of the Executive Directors of the Company are commercial contracts, and contain a clear description of the functions and responsibilities to be assumed according to the provisions of commercial legislation, the Bylaws, regulations applicable to the bodies of the Company and those attributed by the Shareholders' Meeting of Fluidra.

The essential terms and conditions of the contracts of the Executive Directors are as follows:

Term

The Executive Directors have signed an indefinite-term contract for services with the Company which will remain in force for as long as the Directors perform the executive duties delegated to them by the Board of Directors according to their post.

Exclusivity and confidentiality

The contracts establish clauses regulating confidentiality and exclusive dedication, without prejudice to the activities which are expressly authorized, provided they do not hinder the fulfillment of the duties of diligence and loyalty inherent in their post or entail a conflict with the Company.

Post-contractual non-compete and non-solicitation undertaking

Notwithstanding the Executive Directors' undertaking not to compete with the Company while their contracts are in force, a post-contractual non-compete and non-solicitation agreement is established in the Contracts, in the following terms:

- The contract of Mr. Eloy Planes Corts establishes a post-contractual non-compete undertaking with a term of two years as from the date on which the effective provision of his services ends. The economic remuneration established is twice his gross annual fixed remuneration in force at the time of termination of the contract.
- The contract of Mr. Jaime Ramírez establishes a post-contractual non-compete and non-solicitation undertaking with a term of two years as from the date on which his services effectively come to an end. There is no additional compensation for the non-compete and non-solicitation prohibition accepted by Mr. Jaime Ramírez, which is understood to be compensated by the fixed and variable remuneration he receives during the term of his contract.

Severance pay for termination of contract

The severance to which the Executive Directors will be entitled in the event of termination of their contract at the instance of Fluidra for any reason, except in cases of serious and willful or negligent non-fulfillment of their duties as Executive Directors of the Company, will be:

- In the case of Mr. Eloy Planes Corts, an amount equivalent to two times his annual remuneration, based on his gross annual fixed salary for the year in which his contract is terminated and the gross annual variable salary for the preceding year. This severance payment includes the legal indemnity he is entitled to receive for the termination of his previous employment relationship, which lasted 16 years and 7 months and was suspended when he was appointed as a Director.
- In the case of Mr. Jaime Ramírez, an amount equivalent to two times his annual remuneration, based on his gross annual fixed salary for the year in which his contract is terminated and the gross annual variable salary received in the 12 months preceding the termination's effective date.

⁴ Neither remuneration in kind nor contributions to retirement plans are included since their amount is not material.



The Executive Directors will be entitled to receive this severance pay if they decide to terminate their contracts by their own choice, if such termination is due to any of the following causes:

- Serious breach by the Company of any of the contractual obligations related to their position.
- Reduction and substantial limitation of their duties or powers.
- Substantial modification of their contractual conditions.
- Change of ownership of Fluidra's share capital with or without changing the Company's governing bodies.

Advanced notice period

The parties are required to give at least six months' notice before the effective date of termination of the contractual relationship, except when this occurs by mutual agreement, due to serious and willful or negligent non-fulfillment of the Executive Director's professional duties, or a serious breach by the Company of the obligations undertaken in relation to the position of Executive Director. In the event of non-fulfillment of the obligation to give notice, the breaching party will be under the obligation to pay to the other party an amount equal to the fixed remuneration pending payment for the notice period breached.

The Board of Directors will periodically review the conditions of the contracts signed with the Executive Directors in order to include in them any amendments necessary to adapt them to the Remuneration Policy in force at any given time and to the internal regulations of the Company that apply.



5. Engagement of new Directors

Executive Directors

The remuneration system and basic contractual conditions described above will also apply to any new Executive Director who joins the Board of Directors during the term of this Remuneration Policy.

The Board of Directors, upon a proposal by the ARC, will determine the remuneration components and amounts corresponding to the new Executive Directors, having regard to the functions assigned to them, responsibilities assumed, their professional experience, market remuneration levels for such positions and any other factor they feel should be taken into account, with this being reflected in the contract to be signed between the new Executive Director and Fluidra.

Non-executive directors

The remuneration system as described in section 3 above will be applicable to them.



6. Decision-Making process for the determination, review and application of the remuneration policy

The ARC is responsible for reporting and proposing to the Board of Directors the following points for approval, as well as for ensuring their enforcement:

- The Remuneration Policy.
- Individual remuneration and other contractual conditions applicable to the Executive Directors.
- Setting of the individual amount corresponding to each Director in his/her capacity as such, within the maximum amount approved by the Shareholders' Meeting.

In relation to the Remuneration Policy, the ARC draws up the Remuneration Policy proposal along with the mandatory specific report on it, for consideration by the Board of the Directors, and the Board, having reached a reasoned decision, proposes it for approval by the Shareholders' Meeting.

The following are taken into consideration in the process of determining, reviewing and applying the Remuneration Policy:

- The opinions issued by the proxy advisors.
- Corporate governance recommendations.
- The remuneration conditions of the management team, as described in section 8 below.
- Market conditions, with periodic reviews being made by comparing Directors' remuneration with a reference market, having regard to certain objective criteria including, among others, size and complexity of the business and geographical scope of the Fluidra Group and the sector in which it operates.
- Independent external advice where necessary.



7. Measures envisaged to avoid or manage conflicts of interest

The concept of conflict of interest is defined in article 27 of the Board Regulations.

Pursuant to the Board Regulations, the Directors are subject to the following obligations

- Not to directly or indirectly perform professional or commercial transactions with the Company unless authorized by the Company in the terms envisaged in the law, the Bylaws and the Board Regulations.
- To report the existence of conflicts of interest to the Board of Directors.
- To refrain from participating in debates and votes on resolutions with respect to which they, or persons related to them, have a direct or indirect conflict of interest, unless they are authorized to do so by the applicable legislation. This will not apply to resolutions or decisions affecting the Director in his/her capacity as such, such as designation or removal from his/her office on the managing body or similar.
- Refraining from using the name of the Company or flaunting their status as directors to carry out transactions on their own behalf or on behalf of persons related to them.
- Not to directly or indirectly perform professional or commercial transactions with the Company unless authorized by the Company in the terms envisaged in the law, the Bylaws and the Board Regulations.
- To adopt the necessary measures to avoid situations in which their interests, for their own account or for the account of others, may be in conflict with the corporate interest and with their duties to the Company.



8. Relation between the remuneration policy and the conditions applicable to employees of the Company

The conditions with respect to remuneration for the performance of executive functions have been established having regard to the remuneration policy established by the Company for its employees. In this respect, the Remuneration Policy has the following principles in common with the remuneration of Fluidra executives.

Remuneration structure	The remuneration package includes a fixed component, a variable component (short- and long-term) and payments in kind. Fixed remuneration is of an amount sufficient not to assume excessive risks bearing in mind that variable remuneration can be zero if the minimum achievement thresholds for the objectives to which it is linked are not met. The proportion of variable remuneration corresponding to the Executive Directors is higher than that of other directors, the aim being to align their interests with those of the shareholders.
Fair pay	Remuneration is based on criteria relating to position, level of responsibility, functions assumed, skills and level of performance, the absence of any form of discrimination being guaranteed.
Pay for performance	A significant portion of remuneration is variable and is linked to the achievement of financial objectives, non-financial objectives and value creation objectives. These objectives, which are specific and measurable, are aligned with the Company's long-term strategic plan and sustainability. Variable remuneration is not an entitlement, as a result of which no amount whatsoever will be paid if the minimum attainment thresholds are not met.
Alignment with market conditions	Remuneration must be set at levels which reflect market conditions in order to attract, motivate and retain talent. To this regard, employees are paid in accordance with their level of responsibility, leadership, functions discharged and level of performance, the aim of which is to retain key employees and attract talent.

9. Contribution made by the remuneration policy to the Company's strategy and interest and long-term sustainability

The Remuneration Policy is viewed as another element, within the Company's internal policies and principles, which contributes to its business strategy and interests and long-term sustainability:

- The remuneration policy is attractive so that the Company can attract and retain the talent needed to guarantee the stability it requires to achieve long-term objectives, providing the motivation required for the achievement of objectives while avoiding excessive risk-taking and the rewarding of poor results.
 - Variable remuneration is linked to the achievement of financial, value-creation and non-financial objectives, the latter including ESG objectives, which are aligned with the corporate interests and the Company's strategic plan and long-term sustainability.
 - The objectives of the metrics must be demanding and must be reviewed periodically, taking into consideration the economic context, the strategic plan, and the expectations of stakeholder groups.
 - There is no guaranteed variable remuneration, with the possibility of no remuneration being received if the minimum achievement thresholds are not reached.
 - The medium- and long-term incentives are linked to strategic plans of at least three years, promoting sustainable value creation in the Group.
 - Multi-year variable remuneration is settled in the form of shares, making it possible to align the interests of the Executive Directors with those of shareholders.
 - The Remuneration Policy avoids excessive risk-taking:
 - The Board of Directors, upon a proposal by the ARC, analyses, selects and approves the objectives in relation to the variable remuneration of the Executive Directors and executives. In this respect, the objectives, which are established having regard to the Company's strategic plan, value creation and the interests of stakeholder groups, are (i) specific and quantifiable, and (ii) sufficiently demanding.
 - Inclusion in multi-year variable remuneration of a malus clause and clawback clause applicable if certain circumstances arise.
 - Commitment to hold a certain number of shares received in the settlement of share-based remuneration, which also allows for the alignment of the interests of the Executive Directors with those of the shareholders.
- In relation to variable remuneration
- Several metrics are required to be taken into account, including ESG metrics, linked to the sustainability strategy of the Fluidra Group.
 - The objectives of the metrics must be demanding and must be reviewed periodically, taking into consideration the economic context, the strategic plan, and the expectations of stakeholder groups.
 - There is no guaranteed variable remuneration, with the possibility of no remuneration being received if the minimum achievement thresholds are not reached.
 - Long-term incentives are required to be awarded based on value creation, aligning the interests of the Directors with those of the shareholders, and for this reason, they need to have the following characteristics:
 - Minimum 3-year period for the measurement of objectives.
 - Settlement in shares.
 - Obligation to hold the shares received until they reach a value equivalent to twice the amount of fixed remuneration, for a period of 3 years.
 - Inclusion of a malus (reduction) and clawback (recovery) clause.

10. Temporary exceptions

The Board of Directors, upon a proposal by the ARC, may approve the application of temporary exceptions to the Remuneration Policy in exceptional circumstances which make this necessary to serve the long-term interests and sustainability of the Company as a whole or to guarantee its viability.

The procedure to be followed in such cases will be as follows:

- The ARC will issue a report (i) evaluating the exceptional circumstances forming the grounds for applying these exceptions, (ii) detailing the reasons why it considers these exceptions to have been necessary to serve the long-term interests and sustainability of the company, and (iii) indicating the specific remuneration items which would be modified.
- The ARC may seek the advice of external advisers in the preparation of such report.
- In light of the conclusions reached in the report, the ARC, where appropriate, would propose to the Board of Directors the application of the exception.
- Once the Board has reviewed the ARC's report, it will decide whether temporary exceptions should be implemented, as well as the components affected by this.
- Details of and the justification for such temporary exceptions must be disclosed in the corresponding AR

11. Term of the remuneration policy

The Remuneration Policy will be in force in 2025, as from its approval by the 2026, 2027 and 2028 Shareholders' Meeting, except for any amendments, adaptations, updates or substitutions that may be decided from time to time, which will be subject to approval by the Shareholders' Meeting.

Annex I

General conditions of the 2022-2026 Plan

Objective of the 2022-2026 Plan

The 2022-2026 Plan aims to encourage, motivate and retain the management team, linking the incentive to the fulfillment of Fluidra's medium- and long-term strategic plan, which will make it possible to align the interests of the Beneficiaries (as defined below) with those of the shareholders by offering them competitive remuneration that is in line with market remuneration practices and the organizational and strategic situation of the Fluidra Group.

The 2022-2026 Plan consists of the Beneficiaries being entitled to receive a certain number of ordinary shares of the Company (the "**Shares**") subject to the fulfillment of certain requirements.

Instrument

The 2022-2026 Plan is implemented through the award of a certain number of units ("**PSUs**") which will then be used as a reference in order to determine the final number of Shares to be delivered to the Beneficiaries after a certain period of time, as long as certain strategic objectives of the Fluidra Group are fulfilled and the requirements provided for in the Regulations are met.

Term

The 2022-2026 Plan has a term of five (5) years, running from January 1, 2022, with effect from the date of approval of the Plan by the Fluidra Shareholders' Meeting to which this resolution is submitted for approval, (the "**Start Date**") until December 31, 2026 (the "**End Date**"), without prejudice to the effective settlement of the last cycle of the Plan, which will take place in June 2027.

The Plan is divided into three (3) independent cycles (the "**Cycles**") and will have three award dates (the "**Award Dates**") for the target incentive to be received in the event of achieving 100% of the objectives to which it is linked ("**Target Incentive**"), each of which will take place in 2022, 2023 and 2024, respectively.

Each of the Cycles will have an objective measurement period of three (3) years (the "**Measurement Period**"), starting on January 1 of the year in which the Cycle begins (the "**Measurement Period Start Date**") and ending three (3) years after the Measurement Period Start Date, that is, on December 31 of the year the Measurement Period for the Cycle ends (the "**Measurement Period End Date**").

Once the Measurement Period for each Cycle has ended, the associated incentive to which each of the Beneficiaries will be entitled will be determined according to the degree of achievement of the objectives established for the Cycle in question ("**Degree of Achievement**").

The incentive corresponding to each Cycle of the Plan will be settled in the month of June of the year after the Measurement Period End Date, following approval of the financial statements for the year in which the Measurement Period of the Cycle in question ends (the "**Settlement Date**").

Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries of the 2022-2026 Plan (the "**Beneficiaries**") will be the members of the management team of Fluidra and of its subsidiaries making up the Fluidra Group, as determined by the Board of Directors of Fluidra, at the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, who are expressly invited to participate in the Plan via a letter of invitation (the "**Letter of Invitation**") and who expressly accept such invitation.

For these purposes, the Fluidra Shareholders' Meeting designates as Beneficiaries of the 2022-2026 Plan those directors of Fluidra who, during the term of the Plan, are attributed executive functions in the Fluidra Group ("**Executive Directors**"). At the date of approval of the Plan by the Fluidra Shareholders' Meeting, the Executive Directors are Mr. Eloy Planes, Executive Chairman, and Mr. Bruce Brooks, CEO.

Maximum number of Shares included in the Plan

The total number of Shares which, in implementation of the Plan, will be delivered to the Beneficiaries at the end of each Cycle, in the event of achieving 100% of the objectives, will be that resulting from dividing the maximum amount allocated to each Cycle by the weighted average closing price of the Shares for the trading sessions taking place on the thirty (30) days prior to the Measurement Period Start Date of the Cycle in question (the "**Reference Value**"). The maximum total amount allocated to the three Cycles of the Plan if 100% of the related objectives are met is established in the amount of fifty-five million euros.

The maximum total amount allocated to each Cycle of the Plan, if 100% of the objectives are met, will be determined by the Board of Directors, following a report by the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, and may not exceed, for all three Cycles of the Plan as a whole, the aforementioned amount of fifty-five million euros.



In any event, if 100% of the objectives are met, the total number of Shares to be delivered in implementation of the Plan to all of the Beneficiaries in the three Cycles may not exceed 0.8% of the share capital of Fluidra on the date of approval of the Plan, and will be 1.3% in the event of reaching the maximum Degree of Achievement of the objectives.

If the maximum number of Shares allocated to the Plan authorized by the Shareholders' Meeting is insufficient to be able to settle the incentive in Shares corresponding to the Beneficiaries under each Cycle of the Plan, Fluidra will pay in cash the amount of the incentive corresponding to the excess which cannot be settled in Shares.

If 100% of the objectives of the Plan are met, the Executive Directors of Fluidra will be entitled to receive, at the end of each of the three Cycles, a number of Shares equal in value to 250% of their Fixed Annual Remuneration in force on the award date of the incentive corresponding to the Cycle in question, divided by the Reference Value.

In any event, the number of Shares to be delivered will depend on the number of PSUs assigned and on the degree of achievement of the objectives to which the incentive is linked.

For the first Cycle of the Plan, if 100% of the Cycle objectives are met, and taking into consideration the average weighted closing price of the Share for the trading sessions taking place on the thirty (30) days prior to January 1, 2022 and the Annual Fixed Remuneration of the Executive Directors in force on the date of approval of the Plan, 37,651 Shares would be delivered to the Executive Chairman Mr. Eloy Planes and 45,181 Shares would be delivered to the CEO Mr. Bruce Brooks. In the event of reaching the maximum Degree of Achievement of the objectives to which the first Cycle is linked, the number of Shares to be delivered will be 172% of the Shares to be delivered in the event of achieving 100% of the objectives. Accordingly, the maximum number of Shares to be delivered would be 64,670 Shares in the case of Mr. Eloy Planes and 77,711 Shares in the case of Mr. Bruce Brooks.

For each of the remaining Cycles, the Board of Directors, following a report by the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, will determine the maximum amounts that will serve as a basis in order to establish, according to the Reference Value of the Cycle in question, the number of Shares that may be delivered if 100% of the objectives are met and in the event of reaching the maximum Degree of Achievement of the objectives to which the corresponding Cycle is linked. The number of PSUs assigned in each Cycle will be duly reported in the corresponding Annual Report on Directors' Remuneration.

Requirements for settlement of the incentive

The requirements to be met, on a cumulative basis, in order for a Beneficiary to vest the right to receive the incentive corresponding to each Cycle of the 2022-2026 Plan are as follows:

- As regards the total PSUs awarded in relation to each Cycle, the Beneficiaries must remain at the Fluidra Group until the Measurement Period End Date of the Cycle, notwithstanding the provisions envisaged for special leaving situation established in the Regulations, which will also set out the formula to be used for calculation of the PSU vested as at the leaving date.
- Beneficiaries must meet the objectives to which each Cycle of the 2022-2026 Plan is linked, on the terms and conditions described in this agreement and implemented in the Regulations.

In the case of Executive Directors, 100% of the PSUs awarded in each Cycle must be linked to fulfillment of the objectives to which the corresponding Cycle is linked

Objectives

The Degree of Achievement of the incentive corresponding to one Cycle of the Plan, and therefore the number of Shares to be delivered to the Beneficiaries in relation to such Cycle, will depend on the degree of achievement of the objectives that the Board of Directors, at the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, establishes for each Cycle of the 2022-2026 Plan, insofar as relates to the percentage of PSUs awarded which is linked to such achievement.

The objectives will be:

- Objectives in terms of the creation of value for shareholders.
- Economic-financial objectives.
- Targets linked to ESG.

First Cycle

In the first Cycle of the Plan, the Incentive will be linked to achievement of the following strategic objectives of the Company:

- i. Objectives in terms of the creation of value for shareholders. Evolution of the Total Shareholder Return of Fluidra, S.A. ("**TSR**"), in absolute terms.
- ii. Economic-financial objectives. Evolution of the EBITDA of the Fluidra Group.
- iii. ESG targets. S&P rating.

Hereinafter the above will be referred to as the "**Metrics**".

Both the TSR and EBITDA, and the ESG objectives, will be determined during the First Cycle Measurement Period ending on December 31, 2024.

The initial value considered for the purpose of measuring the evolution of the TSR will be the weighted average listed price of the Fluidra share at the close of trading for the trading sessions taking place on the thirty (30) days preceding the First Cycle Measurement Period Start Date, the final value considered being the weighted average listed price of the Fluidra share at



the close of the trading sessions taking place on the thirty (30) days preceding the First Cycle Measurement Period End Date.

The weighting percentages for the Incentive awarded to the Executive Directors will be 50% for the TSR objective, 40% for the EBITDA objective, and 10% for the ESG objective.

In the case of Beneficiaries who are not directors, the Board of Directors will determine, upon a proposal by the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, the part of the Shares whose delivery will depend on achievement of the TSR, EBITDA and ESG objectives.

For the TSR and EBITDA objectives, a Degree of Achievement associated with each objective will be established and this may range between 0% and 180%. The Degree of Achievement deriving from each of the above objectives will be calculated by linear interpolation. In the case of the ESG objective, the Degree of Achievement will be 0% or 100%. The maximum Degree of Achievement for the Executive Directors will therefore be 172%.

Second and Third Cycles

For the Second and Third Cycles of the Plan, the Fluidra Board of Directors, upon a proposal by the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, may decide to continue with or change the Metrics, their relative weights, and the Degree of Achievement established for the First Cycle of the Plan. In the event of the Board of Directors making any change in this respect, the pertinent information will be duly set out in the corresponding Annual Report on Directors' Remuneration.

Delivery of the Shares and rules on disposition

The Shares will be delivered either by Fluidra, or by a third party, depending on the coverage systems finally adopted by the Board of Directors.

Once the Shares have been awarded, and until a period of three years has elapsed as from the End Date, the Executive Directors and members of the executive committee will not be able to transfer ownership of the Shares they may have received under the Plan until they come to own a number of shares equivalent, at least, to their annual fixed remuneration multiplied by two, in the case of the Executive Directors, and by one, for the members of the executive committee. The above, however, does not apply in respect of shares that the Executive Director or member of the executive committee needs to dispose of, should the case arise, to meet costs related to their acquisition, including taxation deriving from the delivery of the Shares, or in the event of a dispensation having been approved by the Board of Directors, upon a favorable report by the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, in response to supervening circumstances of an extraordinary nature which merit such dispensation.

Malus and clawback clauses

The Plan will envisage the corresponding malus and clawback clauses, which will be included in the Regulations. The Board of Directors will determine, where applicable, whether the circumstances that trigger the application of these clauses have occurred and the part of the Incentive which, where appropriate, is to be reduced or recovered.

In relation to the clawback clause, Fluidra, S.A. may demand the return of the Shares delivered under each Cycle of the 2022-2026 Plan, or the cash equivalent thereof, or even offset the delivery made against other remuneration of any type to which the Beneficiary may be entitled if, during the two years following the Settlement Date of each Cycle, it becomes evident that the settlement in question was based wholly or in part on information which has subsequently been clearly shown to be false or to contain serious inaccuracies.

The above will apply to the Executive Directors in all cases and to Beneficiaries who are responsible for such information. Similarly, the Incentive settled in favor of members of the executive committee and the internal auditor, to whom the clawback clause is not applicable, will in any event be recalculated based on the correct information.

Cases of early termination or modification of the 2022-2026 Plan

The Regulations may envisage early termination and settlement or modification of the 2022-2026 Plan in the event of an acquisition or change of control, or if the Shares of Fluidra cease to be listed on an organized market, or in circumstances which, in the view of the Board of Directors, have a material impact on the 2022-2026 Plan.

Coverage system

The system of coverage to be used for the 2022-2026 Plan will be established in due time and form by the Board of Directors of the Company, for which purpose said body is hereby expressly empowered. The Company may allocate treasury shares currently held or which it may come to hold to cover the needs of the Plan, or it may use the financial instrument most suitable in each case.



Annex II

General conditions of the 2025-2029 Plan

Objective of the 2025–2029 Plan

The 2025–2029 Plan aims to encourage, motivate and retain the management team by linking the incentive to the fulfillment of Fluidra's medium- and long-term strategic plan, which will make it possible to align the interests of the Beneficiaries (as defined below) with those of the shareholders by offering them competitive remuneration that is in line with market remuneration practices, and the organizational and strategic situation of the Fluidra Group.

The 2025–2029 Plan consists of the Beneficiaries being entitled to receive a certain number of ordinary shares of the Company (the "**Shares**") subject to the fulfillment of certain requirements.

Instrument

The 2025–2029 Plan is implemented through the award of a certain number of units ("**PSUs**"), which will then be used as a reference in order to calculate the final number of Shares to be delivered to the Beneficiaries after a certain period of time, as long as certain strategic objectives of the Fluidra Group

Term

The Plan is divided into three (3) independent cycles (the "Cycles") and will have three award dates (the "Award Dates") for the target incentive to be received in the event of achieving 100% of the objectives to which it is linked ("Target Incentive"), each of which will take place in 2025, 2026 and 2027, respectively.

Each of the Cycles will have an objective measurement period of three (3) years (the "Measurement Period"), starting on January 1 of the year in which the Cycle begins (the "Measurement Period Start Date") and ending three (3) years after the Measurement Period Start Date, that is, on December 31 of the year the Measurement Period for the Cycle ends (the "Measurement Period End Date").

Once the Measurement Period for each Cycle has ended, the associated incentive to which each of the Beneficiaries will be entitled will be calculated according to the degree of achievement of the objectives established for the Cycle in question ("Degree of Achievement").

The incentive corresponding to each Cycle of the Plan will be settled in the month of June of the year after the Measurement Period End Date, following approval of the financial statements for the year in which the Measurement Period of the Cycle in question ends (the "Settlement Date").

Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries of the 2025–2029 Plan (the "Beneficiaries") will be the members of the management team of Fluidra and of its subsidiaries that make up the Fluidra Group, as determined by the Board of Directors of Fluidra, at the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, who are expressly invited to participate in the Plan via a letter of invitation (the "Letter of Invitation") and who expressly accept this invitation.

For these purposes, the Fluidra Shareholders' Meeting designates as Beneficiaries of the 2025–2029 Plan those directors of Fluidra who, during the term of the Plan, are attributed executive functions in the Fluidra Group ("Executive Directors"). At the date of approval of the Plan by the Fluidra Shareholders' Meeting, the Executive Directors are Mr. Eloy Planes, Executive Chairman, and Mr. Jaime Ramirez, CEO.

Maximum number of Shares included in the Plan

The total number of Shares that, in the implementation of the Plan, will be delivered to the Beneficiaries at the end of each Cycle, in the event of achieving 100% of the objectives, will be that resulting from dividing the maximum amount allocated to each Cycle by the weighted average closing price of the Shares for the trading sessions taking place on the thirty (30) days prior to the Measurement Period Start Date of the Cycle in question (**the "Reference Value"**). The maximum total amount allocated to the three Cycles of the Plan if 100% of the related objectives are met is established in the amount of sixty four million of euros,, and being one hundred and seven million euros in case of reaching the maximum degree of achievement.

The maximum total amount allocated to each Cycle of the Plan, if 100% of the objectives are met, will be determined each year by the Board of Directors, following a report by the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, and may not exceed, for all three Cycles of the Plan as a whole, the aforementioned amount of sixty four million of euros (one hundred and seven million euros in case of reaching the maximum degree of achievement.

In any event, if 100% of the objectives are met, the total number of Shares to be delivered in the implementation of the Plan to all of the Beneficiaries in the three Cycles may not exceed 1.21% of the share capital of Fluidra on the date of approval of the Plan, and will be 2.03% in the event of reaching the maximum Degree of Achievement of the objectives.



If the maximum number of Shares allocated to the Plan authorized by the Shareholders' Meeting is insufficient to be able to settle the incentive in Shares corresponding to the Beneficiaries under each Cycle of the Plan, Fluidra will pay in cash the amount of the incentive corresponding to the excess that cannot be settled in Shares.

If 100% of the objectives of the Plan are met, the Executive Directors of Fluidra will be entitled to receive, at the end of each of the three Cycles, a number of Shares equal in value to 250% in the case of the Executive Chairman and 345% in the case of the CEO of their Fixed Annual Remuneration in force on the award date of the incentive corresponding to the Cycle in question, divided by the Reference Value.

In any event, the number of Shares to be delivered will depend on the number of PSUs assigned and on the degree of achievement of the objectives to which the incentive is linked.

For the first Cycle of the Plan, if 100% of the Cycle objectives are met, based on the average weighted closing price of the Share for the trading sessions taking place on the thirty (30) days prior to January 1, 2025 and the Annual Fixed Remuneration of the Executive Directors in force on the date of approval of the Plan, 51,590 Shares would be delivered to the Executive Chairman Eloy Planes and 105,395 Shares would be delivered to the CEO Jaime Ramirez. In the event of reaching the maximum Degree of Achievement of the objectives to which the first Cycle is linked, the number of Shares to be delivered will be 172% of the Shares to be delivered in the event of achieving 100% of the objectives. Accordingly, the maximum number of Shares to be delivered would be 88,735 Shares in the case of Eloy Planes and 181,279 Shares in the case of Jaime Ramirez.

For each of the remaining Cycles, the Board of Directors, following a report by the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, will set the maximum amounts that will serve as a basis in order to establish, according to the Reference Value of the Cycle in question, the number of Shares that may be delivered if 100% of the objectives are met and in the event of reaching the maximum Degree of Achievement of the objectives to which the corresponding Cycle is linked. The number of PSUs assigned in each Cycle will be duly reported in the corresponding Annual Report on Directors' Remuneration.

Requirements for receiving the incentive

The requirements to be met, on a cumulative basis, in order for a Beneficiary to vest the right to receive the incentive corresponding to each Cycle of the 2025–2029 Plan are as follows:

- As regards the total PSUs awarded in relation to each Cycle, the Beneficiaries must remain at the Fluidra Group until the Measurement Period End Date of the Cycle, notwithstanding the provisions envisaged for special leaving situations established in the Regulations, which will also set out the formula to be used for calculation of the number of PSUs vested as at the leaving date.

- Beneficiaries must meet the objectives to which each Cycle of the 2025–2029 Plan is linked, under the terms and conditions described in this agreement and implemented in the Regulations.

In the case of Executive Directors, 100% of the PSUs awarded in each Cycle must be linked to the fulfillment of the objectives to which the corresponding Cycle is linked.

Targets

The Degree of Achievement of the incentive corresponding to one Cycle of the Plan and, therefore, the number of Shares to be delivered to the Beneficiaries in relation to such a Cycle, will depend on the degree of achievement of the objectives that the Board of Directors, at the proposal of the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, establishes for each Cycle of the 2025–2025 Plan, insofar as relates to the percentage of PSUs awarded that is linked to such achievement.

The objectives will be:

- Objectives in terms of the creation of value for shareholders.
- Economic-financial objectives.
- Targets linked to environment, social and governance (ESG) matters.

First Cycle

In the first Cycle of the Plan, the Incentive will be linked to the achievement of the following strategic objectives of the Company:

- Objectives in terms of the creation of value for shareholders. Evolution of Fluidra's Total Shareholder Return ("TSR"), in absolute terms.
- Economic-financial objectives. Evolution of the EBITDA of the Fluidra Group
- ESG targets. S&P rating.

Hereinafter, the above will be referred to as the "Metrics".

The TSR, EBITDA and ESG objectives will be set during the First Cycle Measurement Period that ends on December 31, 2027.

The initial value considered for the purpose of measuring the evolution of the TSR will be the weighted average listed price of the Fluidra share at the close of trading for the trading sessions taking place on the thirty (30) days preceding the First Cycle Measurement Period Start Date, the final value considered being the weighted average listed price of the Fluidra share at the close of the trading sessions taking place on the thirty (30) days preceding the First Cycle Measurement Period End Date.

The weighting percentages for the Incentive awarded to the Executive Directors will be 50% for the TSR objective, 40% for the EBITDA objective, and 10% for the ESG objective.

In the case of Beneficiaries who are not directors, the Board of Directors will decide, upon a proposal by the Appointments and



Remuneration Committee, the part of the Shares whose delivery will depend on achievement of the TSR, EBITDA and ESG objectives.

For the TSR and EBITDA objectives, a Degree of Achievement associated with each objective will be established, which may range between 0% and 180%. The Degree of Achievement deriving from each of the above objectives will be calculated by linear interpolation. In the case of the ESG objective, the Degree of Achievement will be 0% or 100%. The maximum Degree of Achievement for the Executive Directors will therefore be 172%.

Second and Third Cycles

For the Second and Third Cycles of the Plan, the Fluidra Board of Directors, upon a proposal by the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, may decide to continue with or change the Metrics, their relative weights, and the Degree of Achievement established for the First Cycle of the Plan. In the event of the Board of Directors making any change in this respect, the pertinent information will be duly set out in the corresponding Annual Report on Directors' Remuneration.

Delivery and availability of shares

The Shares will be delivered either by Fluidra, or by a third party, depending on the coverage systems finally adopted by the Board of Directors.

Once the Shares have been awarded, and until a period of three years has elapsed as from the End Date, the Executive Directors and members of the executive committee will not be able to transfer ownership of the Shares they may have received under the Plan until they come to own a number of shares equivalent, at least, to their annual fixed remuneration multiplied by two, in the case of the Executive Directors, and by one, for the members of the executive committee. However, this will not apply in respect of shares that Executive Directors or Executive Committee members need to dispose of in order to cover the acquisition cost, including taxes on the delivered Shares, or if a waiver is obtained from the Board of Directors with a favorable report from the ARC, in order to deal with one-off events that may occur.

Malus and clawback clauses

The Plan will envisage the corresponding malus and clawback clauses, which will be included in the Regulations. The Board of Directors will determine, where applicable, whether the circumstances that trigger the application of these clauses have occurred and the part of the Incentive which, where appropriate, is to be reduced or recovered.

In relation to the clawback clause, Fluidra, S.A. may demand the return of the Shares delivered under each Cycle of the 2025–2029 Plan, or the cash equivalent thereof, or even offset the delivery made against other remuneration of any type to which the Beneficiary may be entitled if, during the two years following the Settlement Date of each Cycle, it becomes evident that the settlement in question was based wholly or in part on information which has subsequently been clearly shown to be

false or to contain serious inaccuracies. The above will apply to the Executive Directors in all cases and to Beneficiaries who are responsible for such information or who breach internal policies and regulations. The clawback clause will also apply to any Beneficiaries who have breached any of the Group's internal standards and policies or if their negligent conduct has entailed significant losses for the Group. Similarly, the Incentive paid to members of the executive committee and the internal auditor, to whom the clawback clause is not applicable, will in any event be recalculated based on the correct economic and financial information.

Cases of early termination or modification of the 2025–2029 Plan

The Regulations may envisage early termination and settlement or modification of the 2025–2029 Plan in the event of an acquisition or change of control, or if the Shares of Fluidra cease to be listed on an organized market, or in circumstances which, in the view of the Board of Directors, have a material impact on the 2025–2029 Plan.

Payout scheme

The system of coverage to be used for the 2025–2029 Plan will be established in due time and form by the Board of Directors of the Company, for which purpose said body is hereby expressly empowered. The Company may allocate treasury shares currently held or which it may come to hold to cover the needs of the Plan, or it may use the financial instrument most suitable in each case.